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Abstract
The problem the fisheries economists face is that of determining
and recommending the fishing intensity that will maximize the economic
value to the consuming societies and also maximize the producers' surplus
at a level of production in perpetuity.
In this paper the optimal control theoretic approach is employed
to theoretically answer this problem within the framework of a one
country-one fish species economy.
In order to derive quantitative as well as qualitative results,
a quadratic objective function - linear population dynamics model is
solved for the optimally controlled catch over time. A general conclusion
is that if the initial fish population is smaller than the desired or
target population to be determined in the text, the fishing intensity
must be curtailed to such a degree that fish population can grow so
that in the long run the target catch can be attained at the level of
steady population(which will be sustained in perpetuity) . A governmental
regulation over the total catch ts supported in this case since the social
value in the market of a unit catch always exceeds the individual marginal
cost of catching the same. Mesh size regulations are also supported due
mainly to the fact that the information on the optimal mesh size is external
to individual fisherman.
In Appendix detailed derivation procedures of the optimal control
are developed. Also a model with quadratic objective function and quadra-
tic population dynamics is traced out for optimal control paths by using
a phase diagram.
** The author is grateful to his colleague Professor Royall Brandis for
his continued advice and encouragement in this work.
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Dynamic Theory of Fisheries Economics - 1=^
--Optimal Control Ttieoretic Approach--
T. Takayama""
IntrodLict ion
Fish have been a rrajcr source of protein in the diet of a large por-
tion of the world population, and the demand for it has been steadily
increasing, while the fish stocks are finite. Contrary to nonrenewable
sources such as petroleum and other mineral resources, fish stocks belong
to a class of resources for direct human consumption that are renewable.
The process und speed of renewal are different smong different species.
Thus, in order to maintain a steady fish population, the proportion of
the catch of one species to the total population of the same species can
be quite different among species. Also, interaction among various fish
species can be quite an important factor governing the growth of the fish
population.
However interesting the population dynamics of fish population may
be, fisheries economists should not recognize it as the sole objective
of study. The problem the fisheries economists face is that of determin-
ing and recommending the fishing intensity that will maximize the economic
value to the consuming societies and also maximize the producers' profit
or surplus at a level of production in perpetuity.
In this paper, we first discuss some general properties of fish
population dynamics in relation to fishing intensity. Then we use this
'This work is partially supported by the Ford Foundation Grant
#IEO #750 - 0111.
*''=Professor of Economics, University of Illinois at Champalgn-Urbana,

as the basic dynamic process the society observes in maximizing an objec-
tive function this society reveals in relation with fish consumption and
production (catching).
Since we conceive that the fish population follows a typical dynamics,
the objective function ("performance function" in optimal control termi-
nology) takes a form of an integration of an instantaneous objective value
over time. Therefore, a typical optimal control formulation of fisheries
economies results.
After a general formulation of the fisheries economics problem, when
the number of species and nations are restricted to only one, we solve a
problem of a quadratic (objective f unct ional)— 1 inear (population-catch
dynamics) optimal catch control problem. The solution reveals that there
exist two solutions, one stable convergent optimal path and one other un-
stable path. A general conclusion is that if the initial fish population
is smaller than the desired or target population to be determined later in
the text, the fishing intensity must be curtailed to such a degree that
fish population can grow (optimally) so that in the long run the target
catch can be attained at the level of steady population (which will be
sustained in perpetuity).
Even though there is no problem when the initial fish population is
larger than the target population, we will discuss some interesting aspects
that may lead us to another exciting topic, that is, "game theoretic
formulation" of fisheries economics in which multiple nations (societies)
and multiple fish species are involved.
In conclusion, we will investigate some possible implications of our
solutions and discuss some future topics of great interest.
'.1 i-
]. A Short Review and Dynamics of Fish Population
In his 196^ article [9] in the American Economic Review , Turvey
developed a static steady state bionomic equilibrium model to determine
optimum weight of catch and fishing effort, and asserted "the fundamental
principle that either mesh regulation or the control of fishing effort is
better than nothing but that regulation of both is still better" (pp. 73-
Boyd in his 1966 article in the same journal [4], following Turvey,
developed a comprehensive static model including both the market demand
function and the total cost function as a function of total fish catch,
and showed how to solve the system for an equilibrium catch.
However, in these models no special effort was made to (I) formulating
their problem in its most natural dynamic optimization framework with either
finite or infinite time horizon, (2) introducing mult i -species in fish
population dynamics and/or (3) in market demand and/or supply functions,
and finally, (h) introducing multiple nations with either conflicting in-
terests or in collusive or cooperative relationships.
In this paper i plan to pave the way to cover the first three points
mentioned above.
Later, in 19&7, a simulation model to determine equilibrium paths
of fish populations, consumption (= catch), and prices for two fish species
was developed by Lampe [7]. The multiple species-one country optimal con-
trol modeling results will be reported in the next paper. Another paper
will show how to cover all four points above by utilizing "differential
game theoretic approach" [8].

In this paper, almost all of the concepts used by Turvey and Boyd
(in the worlds referred to above) will be redefined in a new dynamic en-
vironment. "Mesh size" will not be considered as a control variable in
the model that follows, but "catch" will be. Later, I will come back to
this point and discuss policy recommendations on the mesh size and the
catch in a new light.
In optimal control theoretic jargon, fish population can be expressed
as "state variable." The fish population dynamics can be written in the
following general functional relationship:
(1) P = f (p, X, t), t c [0, T)
where p is fish population
X is fishing intensity or catch, control variable,
t is time,
T is the final time at which our plan ceases to become
effect ive,
and
p is the time derivative of the fish population,
if we assume the population dynamics (1) is time independent, then
we may be able to write it simply as
(2) p = f (p, x), t e [0, T) .
When we set p = 0, we can draw the steady state locus (relationship)
between p and x as
(3) f (p, x) = 0, t £ [0, T) .
For the standard work on the dynamics of fish populations, the
reader is referred to [3].

One conceivable dynamic relationship is shown In Figure 1 below,
which can be written as
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Figure 1. Linear Relationship
w p=a+bp-x, te [O, T)
(a = and b > In the case of Figure 1)
.
Equation (4) exhibits the following fish population dynamics; if
the catch is maintained at x over time and the initial population of the
fish species Is at p^, then p is positive and the population will steadily
increase. However, if the catch level Is at x^ and the initial population
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Is at pQ, then the fish population will steadily decrease. The only ini-
3tial population that would not be affected by this catch level is p.. At
3this level the new recruitment volume bp. is exactly equal to fishing
intensity x_, and the sustained steady state population p is attained.

Another conceivable relationship between p and x of (3) is shown
below (Figure 2). in this case, the absolute maximum population is
reached at p.
Figure 2. Nonlinear Relationships
This nonlinear case, Figure 1, differs substantially from the
linear case. After the population reaches p, the catch has to be cui
—
tailed to make the population grow (Boyd, p. 515). This point will be
clarified In a later paper.
The population dynamics, no matter how detailed their construct may
be, lacks economic consideration.
In the next section we will Introduce economic concepts considered
relevant to our fisheries economics.

2. Dynamic Fisheries Optimat Control Model: Formulation in Competitive Market
As was stated at the beginning of this paper, the problem at hand
is to determine the fishing intensity, x, that will maximize the economic
value to the consuming society and also maximize the producers' profit
or surplus at the level of production in perpetuity.
The economic value to the consuming society can be expressed in terms
of a welfare gain or an integral under the market demand function. If we
write the market demand function as
(5) P^ = D (x, t), t e [0, T)
where P denotes market price of per unit weight of the fish, the consumer
benefit function over time can be written as
(6) G (x, t) = f e-jr D (x. t) dx dt
where r is the discount rate of the future in reference to the present,
The Industry supply function can be written as
(7) P = S (p, X, t) , t e [0, T)
and is the horizontal summation of individual marginal cost curves. The
total cost function of catching x units of the fish at time t, TC (x , t)
,
can be then expressed as
(8) TC (p, x, t) =) f ^~'^\[ S(p. X. * ) ^' dt
in
V. L. Smith [9] , /'Economics of Production from Natural Resources,'
Am. Econ. Rev
.
,
June 1968, 58, developed models similar to this. My views
about his approach Is partially discussed In the Appendix.

8If we also assume that the concept of the "consumers' and producers'
surplus" IS an operationally valid concept, one can write the value as
(9) Social Pay-Off (p, x, t) = SPO (p, x, t)
= G(x, t) -TC (p, X, t) , t e [0, T) .
Now the fishery optimal control (FOC) model can be defined as
FOC Model : Find the optimal control x (P , t) , t £ [0, T) , that
maximizes SPO (p, x, t) subject to the population dynamics (1) or
(2).
The necessary conditions for the optimal ity of p, x may be given by
(0 P = f (p, X, t), p(0) = p,
(10)
'0
l',\ { i df^ ^ dSPO(2) A = (r - ^) A - -^
dSPO df_
= n
(3) dx ~ dx
-rt.
I
(If) A(T) = 0, T finite, or 1 im e A(t) =
t-H»
and the solutions, if they exist, may exhibit stability, instability aspects
of the solution paths, as well as comparative dynamics of changing the
discount rate, r, and other parameters in (l) or (10) and (9).
The existence of an optimal control (catch) for this problem depends
on the following conditions:
The SPO (p, x) must be strictly concave with respect to x (in
1^ = {^U^O}) and f (p, x) in (l) must be a concave function of x for each
p, etc. (for detailed arguments, see [1]).
^We restrict our argument here to time invariant objective function
(8) and time invariant population dynamics (l).

The usual phase diagram analyses and related interpretations will
be given later In this paper in specific reference to the quadratic linear
case.
In the objective function (9) no condition on the terminal state
was specified. Naturally, when the time horizon is finite, policy-decision
makers would like to have some fish population target level specified. This
can be done easily and will be discussed later.
3. Optimal Catch Control in Competitive Market :
Quadratic Benefit and Linear Dynamics Case
in this section we analyze a special but most operational case in
which the social pay-off or benefit function, (9), is quadratic and the
fish population dynamics is linear, (k)
.
In constructing the social pay-off function, we make full use of
the Marshal lian market demand function for the fish species. We also re-
strict ourselves to the case in which the market demand function is a linear
function such as
(11) Pd = a - 6x 5
where Pd denotes the market demand price per unit weight of the fish:
a, B are positive constant parameters. The consumers' benefit can be
expressed as the integral of (11) over x, that is,
(12) G(x) = a X - J 3x^.
The cost of catching x units of fish is defined as
(13) TC(x) = yx + jQx^
_
Interested readers can refer to [l, 8] for further details.
The dynamic identification, t, of x(t)
,
p(t) , etc., will be omitted,
unless otherwise stated, in the following development.
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(14) where y is a finite constant obeying the restriction
that a - y > and 9 is a positive constant or of
magnitude g + 6 > 0.
Therefore, the social benefit function can be written as
T
(15) SPO(x) = r e"''^[(a - y)x - ^ (e + 6) x^] dt
for t e [0, T) and T > 0.
The social benefit function defined in (15) can be modified to in-
clude the penalty of not reaching a certain target level of fish population
in a finite time horizon T « «>. However, for the time being, we will ignore
it and, instead, analyze the properties of solution paths of the optimal
control model when the time horizon extends toward infinity. The finite
horizon case will be discussed in the Appendix.
The fishery optimal control problem can now be defined as:
Problem 1 : Find the path(s) of optimally controlled intensity of
catch, x*(p(t), t) (as a function of p(t) (and t)), that maximizes (15)
subject to {k)
.
Our task is to find the optimal feedbacl< control
(16) x*(p(t), t) = (^(p(t), t)
which observes the dynamic but continuous change in the fish population
In the ocean and adjusts the catch to attain the maximum consumer's and
producers' benefit in the long run.
The necessary conditions for competitive solutions are
i &m I ;j •
11
(17)
p = a + bp - X, p(0) = Pq
X = (r - b)X
lim e"'''x(t) =
t->oo
(a - u) - (3 + 9)x - X =
There exist two solutions for (17): (i) singular and unstable
solution, and (ii) stable solution converging to a finite p" and x*(p''0,
provided that {]k) and
(18)
hold,
g - y
6 + 6
- a >
The singular optimal control is
(19) x* =
a - VJ
s 6 + 6
which is independent of p(t) or t. Obviously this is unstable unless the
fish population is at
(20) Ps - b ^FTT^ •
The stable optimally controlled (closed-loop) catch is given by
(21) xMp(t))=|^a_-^._ _ i2b_:_jl(a_^ _ 3) ^ (2b . ,)p(0,
Employing this feedback optimal control X"(p(t)), the fish population
dynamics (4) turn out to be
(22) P =
(b - r) /a - p V /, . ,•.
K (^-T-T - a) - (b - r)p(t)
For the derivation of the solutions, refer to the Appendix at the
end of this paper.
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which converges monotonical ly as long as
(23) b - r >
holds.
The resulting equilibrium fish population (steady-state fish popu-
lation in perpetuity) is
(211) P*-f(|^->'°
due to (18).
From (17) one can easily derive
(25) ^= (^-'-)(f^-x).
which is independent of p,
With (4) and (25) together, and making use of our knowledge ^bout
X*(p(t)), we can draw the following phase diagram.
r S + e' ' bb(2b - 'e
I /a - p %
Figure 3- Phase Diagram for Competitive Case
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4. Implications of MOdel Solutions: Is Catch Control Necessary?
The trajectory AE and A'E are the stable opt imal -catch control
paths that converge to the equilibrium catch E on the steady state fish
population dynamics loci SES'(p =0). EB (excluding E) and EB' are un-
stable singular control paths on which the fish population diminishes
steadily and increases steadily respectively.
On the stable path AE , the fish population steadily and asymptotically
increases to reach the terminal desired or target population p* , and on
A'E it decreases steadily and asymptotically to reach p".
p«
Figure 4. Fish Population Along AE and A'E
When the initial fish population is smaller than p" , it is not
advisable to catch fish to the extent that maximizes the Instantaneous
benefit, that is, x*. The catch that eventually brings the maximum
benefit must be smaller than x'^. Therefore, the catch should be con-
trolled. But can the catch be controlled? This question will be dis-
cussed later in relation to the question of mesh size control.
If the initial fish population is larger than p-' , then there may
not be any incentive to bring the population down to p- . Thus, purely
from the social benefit maximization point of view, the optimal catch
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will stop at X". The reason that we have this path is that the necessary
conditions (16) forced the population to cease growing, thus bringing the
population to E along A'E. Practically however, this path A'E, may be
of some importance in managing private or public lakes. At a certain
stage, with a very small amount of catch of say, bass, in a lake, the fish
population may be boosted to such an extent that drastic measures may be
called for to bring the population back to some ecologically and biologi-
cally desirable level. In this case, the path A'E is a desired path to
follow. Also, there is a distinct possibility that similar control measure
as this may be needed by a small country like New Zealand, for instance,
once the two hundred mile territorial water is enforced to exclude the
fishing fleet from other nations. This, however, belongs to a class of
differential game problems and will be treated fully in the next paper.
Figure 5 shows two (closed-loop) optimal catch control paths corres-
1 2
ponding to the initial fish populations of p^^ and p..
t
Figure 5- Optimally Controlled Catch Paths
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A general conclusion on the control of catch is due. This model
clearly shows that in order to attain the maximum social benefit over
a long period of time, the catch has to follow the path on AE or A'E. Im-
patient or self-proclaimed optimal catch x"^ at any moment of time in the
most prevalent situation in which fish are scarce, relative to the need
and demand of a society, will lead the whole society to predictable
misery. Do numerous competitive fishermen know what is the optimal catch
to the society and to the industry now and at any time t in the future?
It is doubtful that they do. Most likely they expend their utmost effort
at any time t to catch as much as they can if there is no governmental
regulation on their catch. Impatience and lack of information on the
future of the fishing industry by the society, coupled with industrious-
ness of the fishermen, are disasterous to the industry and the consuming
society.
One can refer to necessary conditions (17), especially the last
condition using the optimal catch X'-(p(t)),
(26) a - BxMp(t)) - M - 6x''--(p(t)) = ^Mp(t)),'^
to explain the situation above in more sophisticated economics jargon.
It is easy to show that the demand price, a - Bx*(p(t)), is always
higher than the supply price, ]i + ex"(p(t)), by A,"(p(t)) (marginal value
product of the fishing banks [k]
,
p. 516), as long as the fish population
p(t) is smaller than p" and vice versa. It can be argued that the marginal
social product measured in the demand price diverges by X'''(p(t)) from the
marginal private product measured by the industry cost (= private marginal
cost)
.
A"(p(t)) converges monotonical ly to zero from above when p_ < p''
and from below when p^^ > p-' (see page 17 for these conclusions).
(1:; ii :)Giiif. \
.' i '>"i»ii7^i "'. v»'^-
K>ri: <}eiibn] '='."!,3 o'; 2i.>-i-"fis
I
. I >. ,'.3},
[ y-.; I. . I f <;.:\^;^v>
''i6( <.-i' K:.n<):i« bs'^BOM't ;,
.^ I UqOr] r| 3 i ^ -.M fS (.r .>l >f. . i«''U
.^q > .^4- '
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The abnormal profit when p(t) < p- may encourage the fishing indus-
try to go for a larger catch, with larger numbers of fishermen participating,
due to free entry assumption of a competitive market. This is exactly why
governmental regulation is necessary in the fishing industry over the total
catch of a fish species. And when p^ > p-' , a governmental subsidy scheme
is needed to bring the fish population to the desired level p" (for static
reasoning for this conclusion, see uan Meir [11]).
The following additional conclusions can be derived from the results
obtained so far.
1. The future discount rate does not affect the terminal or
target optimal catch, X" , or fish population, p"'-.
2. For any given initial fish population p smaller than the target
population p-', an increase in r wi 1 1 make the optimal catch larger, and
vice versa; a revelation of impatience as the society more heavily discount
the future than before, and vice versa. in case p is greater than the
target population, p" , the optimal catch for any p^ will be smaller than
before if r increases.
3. If b is larger, then the target population becomes smaller (provided
the demand and cost situations are the same and the two different species
exhibit different population dynamics in terms of b only).
k. If r gets larger (but r < b) , the process of convergence of p"(t) and
X"(p(t)) becomes slower. This is another effect of r similar to (2) men-
tioned above, expressed this .time in terms of the rate of convergence to
the desired p-- . Since by (2) the society catches more now or till some finite
time t as r Increases, the fish population grows at a slower convergence
of the optimal control and state. The cases with r > b are discussed in
the conclusion of this paper.
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5- The market demand price, pB, supply price, P's
,
and the social and
private product discrepancy, X- (p(t) ), move along the following paths:
(27) Pd(p(t)) = a - 6x>\{p(t))
'2
Ps(p(t)) = p + ex--'-(p(t))
A"(p(t)) = Pd - PS .
When p(t) < p", Pd(p(t)) approaches to
V " 6 ( q , n) = a - g( - , ) from below. The discrepancy Is
p + p + o
X"(p(t)) and all three are shown in Figure 5 below.
Pd
P§
X*
Pd(PQ)
Pd = P=4
pKPq)
Pd(p(t))
Figure 5- Pd(p(t)), P's(p(t)), and A"(p(t)) Paths; (p(t) < p''0
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So far, we have investigated some interesting properties of our
quadratic-linear optimal fish catch control model. In the next section
some policy issues will be discussed in reference to our modeling method-
ology.
5. Control of Catch and/or Mesh Size
In the previous section I concurred (though for different reasons)
with Turvey's contention that governmental catch control regulation is
unavoidable in the fishing industry. In this section 1 want to advance
an argument and modeling framework that would help find an optimal mesh
size as well as the level of catch consistent with the mesh size, which
should also be regulated.
Boyd [k]
,
following Turvey [lO] , developed a static model that re-
lates the recruitment (catch) of the fish as a function of both mesh size
and the size of the annual catch. Since there is a danger of misinter-
preting static model assumptions in dynamic modeling framework, I would
rather choose to present my model assumptions in introducing mesh size in
my model developed in the previous sections.
It is a well-known fact that there exists a minimum fish size below
which the fish may not be commercially handled. It stands to reason that
the mesh size must be large enough to catch commercially disposable fish.
Therefore, we can safely assume that there is a minimum mesh size, say mo.
Now, I advance the following hypothesis:
For any mesh size, m equal to or greater than mo, there corresponds
a fish population dynamics, that is,
(28) p = a(m) + b(m) p(t) - x(t) , for t e[0, T) and m ^ mo
.
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On the supply side, the cost of catching x(t) fish with mesh size m
can be written as
(29) S(xh, t) = p(m) + e(m)x(t).
On the demand side, there is no change since most likely the consumers
do not know anything about mesh sizes with which the fish they consume are
caught
.
Following the development and conclusions of the previous section,
we can derive the following conclusion:
For each mesh size (m) there exists a stable optimal catch control
path for any initial fish population, provided that conditions
(23') b(m) - r >
for any m ^ mo hold .
After a sufficiently long time period, the instantaneous benefit can
be very close to
(3) SPO(m) = (a - y(m))xMm) - j (3 + (m) ) (x " (m) ) ^
where
/^ i \ I / \ a - y (m) ^ ^(31) x-"-(m) =
gj^j for any m
s mo.
Natural 1y we have.
It is not known, in general, whether the social pay-off or benefit
function SPO(m) in (28) is a concave function or not. However, this will
most likely be the case.
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If (30) is a concave function with respect to in(s:(no), then there
will be the maximum SPO(m) at say m--—m-- may not be unique. However,
we choose one m"
.
One may be able to conclude that the mesh size m-'-' is the most de-
s i rab! e s ize.
Following the same line of logic as we employed in section 3, we can
conclude that as long as p < p''-(m''') and m^ s mo, there must be a regula-
tion limiting the total catch. The most desirable mesh size (which could
consist of a mixture of different size meshes ^ mo) can be found as
^ • (^ mo). However, this information is external to the fishermen,
and the mesh size m" should be recommended, from the social value point
of view, as the one to be used by all the fishermen. Whether or not this
recommendation should be instituted as a regulation is a difficult question
to answer, in general, and should be considered in a rather specific and
practical context.
In one of the papers to follow this, I plan to investigate a model
which reflects the size of the fish population in the cost function (12).
p
This observation has been prompted by the paper by Van Meir [ll] and incor-
porated in my general formulation (7). This will complicate the solution
procedures, but may not change the general properties of the solution.
5. Quadratic-Linear Optimal Catch Control Model for a Monopolist
In the non-central ly p.lanned countries it is not likely that the
fishery industry is run by a monopolist. However, for theoretical com-
pleteness, a case of optimal catch control by a monopolist will be developed
_
See Chart 2 of [10]
.
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here. Also, to save the paper space, only a quadratic profit functional
and linear dynamics case will be presented below.
if we assume that the market demand function remains the same as
(11) after the monopolist tal<es over the market, the cost structure is
assumed to be
(33) TC(x) = )ix + ex^
with parameters satisfying (14),
Ignoring the terminal cost or penalty function, the monopolist profit
function can be written as
T
(34) ^(x) =J
e"''^[(a- y)x - (e + e)x^]dt
for te[Q, T) and T > 0.
The monopolist is considered to observe the fish population dynamics
(k) while trying to maximize his profit over the entire time horizon, (3^)
.
This last assumption is a standard monopolist assumption but in a dynamic
s i tuat Ion, such as in fishery industry, may turn out to be an impractical
one as we will eventually discuss later in this section in conjunction
with a catch control regulation.
Let us now define our monopolist optimal catch control problem as
Problem 2 : Find the path(s) of optimally control of intensity of
catch, x(p(t) , t) , that maximizes (3^) subject to (k) .
The optimal catch in the feedback form can be given by-^
(35) ;(p(t)) . jf^^- <?M_-1,J^_:_H_^ . 3) , ,2t - .)p(t).
The terminal or targer catch is given as
9
See Appendix at the end of this paper.
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^^^^
^
= 2(b + 8)
and the target fish population will be
(37)
— 1 / a - y
9 = 7- U/-. ..K - ab \2(g + e)
The process of convergence of (35) follows the mode of that of p
which is given as
(b -
^^(,^^^^-a)-(b-r)p(t).(38)
For these solutions to be economically meaningful, they have to
satisfy the following conditions:
(39)
a - \i >
a - |i
- a >
(40)
2(3 + e)
b - r > .
There exists a singular control
— a - vi
^= == 2(e + e)
which is unstable except at p = p.
o
All the properties of our solutions for the competitive market case
apply to this case.
It is quite natural to conclude that the monopolist has every reason
to follow the optimal catch rule laid down by (35) in order to attain the
maximum long-run profit. However, it is also equally conceivable that
the maximum profit motive may have very little to do with the idea that
the monopolist has to stay in the industry forever. If it plans to maximize
the profit in, say, 10 years, it may most likely choose a different optimal
B»b; ». r
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catch control rule. It may even catch a larger quantity of fish (very
close to X if this is at all possible) in a few years' time than the in-
finite horizon optimal catch suggests, and may eventually make an abrupt
exit from the industry, leaving the consuming society without the fish
species on their table. As private ethic and public ethic can be differ-
ent, unless the society acts to prevent the monopolist from abandoning the
industry after quickly exploiting the fish stocks, there could be a socially
undesirable situation that 1 discussed above.
Therefore, in the monopolist case, as well as the competitive market
case, catch regulation must be followed or, more strongly, enforced.
The optimal determination of the mesh size in the monopolist case
can be more easily accomplished by the monopolist since it is in his own
interest to choose the profit maximizing mesh size, say m*
One can argue about relative magnitudes of target catch size and
fish population size between competitive and monopolist market structures,
and I leave these theo ret ical exercises to the reader (see pp. 206-209 of
[11] for an interesting discussion on this point).
6. Future Research Directions
The dynamic optimal control formulation of fisheries economics,
developed above, opens up various avenues to future research in this field,
A natural extention of our single fish species-single country
formulation is a multiple fish species-single country formulation which
I will present shortly.
With multiple, say n (> 1) species formulation, a system of market
demand functions goes into the society benefit function along with the
Industry cost function.

•f
2U ,
The fish population dynamics expand into a system of n fish '
population dynamics. Even in its most operational formulation, namely,
a quadratic-linear version, careful pereliminary investigations on exis-
tence of a solution, controllability, observability, and stability proper-
ties of the system need to be carried out. Aside from theoretical scrutiny
of the problems at hand, there are many practical, exciting problems re-
lated to ecology, environmental protection, etc.
Tuna and dolphin create a serious problem to our society. Here is
a problem of inherent interactions between two species in their habitat
and between two groups in the society; consumers seriously concerned about
the possibility of extinction of a lovely and intelligent fish species
and the tuna fishermen struggling for their existence fishing tuna (and
i
possibly some dolphins). Mesh size control does not solve this problem.
Catch control has proved almost impossible. Is it possible for the tuna
industry to breed dolphin and release them to replace the unfortunate
ones thotdied in the fishermen's nets? i
These interactions can be traced out in a multiple species formula- ;
tion.
,
Another natural extension is toward solving single and then multiple
,
species-multiple nations problems in a fisheries economy. Here come !
i
conflicts of interest among nations over their territorial sea. The ',
cod war between Iceland and the United Kingdom in recent years is one I
typical example. Unless all the nations involved in fishing activities *
>
agree to cooperate and use a common currency, the multiple nation formula- \
tion cannot be reduced to a simple optimal control problem. Therefore, I
we have to step outside the realm of familiar optimal control theory into
!
the so-called "differential game theory."
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In the next paper, I plan to show some interesting features of a
two-country/one-species fisheries economics model in the differential
game theoretic framework and discuss some implications of the model results,
Naturally, it is more to the satisfaction of many theorists if the
quadratic-linear form can be generalized and still rich quantitative
conclusions can be obtained. One can strive for it, and here we have
a great need for interdisciplinary work ahead of us. Fisheries techni-
cians, optimal control and differential game theorists and practioners,
economists specializing in this and related field can work together to
make regulations and controls economically and politically viable and
sound.
7- Conclusions
In this paper a dynamic theory of fisheries economics within one
nation-one species framework has been developed in the optimal control
theoretic framework. Conclusions from the quadratic benefit and linear
dynamics case are quite interesting. First of all, static analysis con-
centrates on the ultimate target catch or population only and ignores the
processes along which optimal catch leads the industry and the consuming
society to the target, if it exists. The characteristics of the processes
are important, and not the target state or control value per se
.
Secondly, the catch must be regulated if the fish stocks are not
abundant already, due to the clear-cut discrepancy between the social
value product of a unit of the fish and the private value product explained
at the end of section k of this paper.
Thirdly, the optimal mesh size should be studied carefully in
relation to fish population dynamics and the resultant fishing cost
through fishing effott. Proper recommendations should be made on the
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optimal mesh size. Irrespective of the need for finding the optimal mesh
size, the minimum mesh size for each species should be stipulated as a
governmental regulation, if there is only one species of fish we are
concerned about. A multiple species case will be dealt with in another
paper.
Fourthly, the future discount rate, r, of social benefit is not a
determining factor of target population or catch. However, it affects
the rate of convergence of the optimal catch and the fish population to
the desired levels or targets. The larger the future discount, the greater
the present catch and thus the slower the fish population growth. However,
as long as the catch is on the optimal path, it will lead itself to the
target catch and population no matter what the discount rate may be.
Figure 6 below shows this relationship.
Figure 6. Different Discount Rates and Corresponding
Optimal Catch and Population Paths
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When b - r > 0, but r increases from r to r,(r, > r) , then the
optimal catch path moves upward from AE to A E (downward from A E to A.'E).
When b = r, the optimal control disappears. The only solution is
the singular solution x"^ which does not render any guidelines to maximizing
the society benefit over the long run.
When b < r, and 2b > r^or b < r < 2b, the pattern of convergence
reverses itself in the BE a and B'Ea' domains, and given the initial fish
population p (except p = p--) every optimal catch control path will move
away from E.
If r = 2b, the singular, unstable control x"'-' is the only catch control
law we have. On the other hand, if the society discount the future more
severely than this case, and we assume r > 2b, then we have unstable, and
-5-
->
explosive paths EF and EF^
These cases with r > b are not our concern at this stage, even though
there is a lesson we can learn from this on how Important the way we, the
present generation, weigh the value of our future generations in deter-
mining the future course of the fishing activities and fish populations.
In this paper, I agree completely with Dr. Buri<enroad ' s view on
the principle of fisheries management: "The management of fisheries is
intended for the benefit of man, not fish; therefore, effect of manage-
ment of fish stocks cannot be regarded as beneficial per se" [5] Thus,
I constructed a dynamic model to handle the fisheries economics or manage-
ment problems. I hope this model and model conclusions serve as extensions
of models and theories advanced by our precursors in this field, such as
Crutchfield and Zel loner [6],Turvey, Boyd, Bell [2], Burkenroad [5],
van Meir, Smith, and others.
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In the next paper, I will deal with two country/one fish species
problems in the differential game theoretic framework and derive some
interesting noncooperat ive game type conclusions (along with cooperative
game type ones)
.
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APPENDIX
(A.l)
COMPETITIVE MARKET
The necessary conditions for optimal competitive solutions are;
[1) p = a + bp - X
[2) X = (r - b) A = -(b - r)A
>
[3) a - v(B + e)x - A =
'i») X(T) = or 1 im e"'''^X(t) =
t-Xx.
Let us set
(A. 2) A = Kp + E
where K and E are Recatti coefficients and time dependent in
general
.
By using (A. 2), we can write the optimal catch x as the function
of p (closed-loop or feedback control) via (A. 1.3):
(A. 3) :—- (a - y ^Kp- E)
B + 9
Differentiating (A. 2) with respect to time t, we get
(A.i») A = Kp + Kp + E
(a - y)
= (K-.bK.^^)p.aK--i|-^K.
By (A. 1 .2) and (A. 2) , we get
(A. 5) A = (r - b) (Kp +E).
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Setting (A. 4) and (A. 5) equal to each other and factoring out,
we have:
(A. 6) {K + bK + j-j^ + (b - r)K} p
1
= 0, for all p.
B + 6
KE + (b - r)E + E}
(A. 7)
For the finite time horizon T, we have to soive
2
(i) K = -bK K
g + 6
- (b - r)K, K(T) =
hi) iJ^^\-^K
B + e
KE - (b - r)E, E(T) =
backward from time T as the boundary conditions are known to be zero.
When the time horizon tends towards infinity, then it can be
shown that K and E will converge to some constants (K = 0, E = 0). There-
fore, in this case, our task is to solve
K
(A. 8)
(i) (2b - r - -)K =
B + 6
One set of solutions is
4<E - (b - r)E = 0,
(A. 9)
J
K =
E =
which give rise to the singular solution
a - y(A. 10) x^ = for t ^ 0.
(A. 11)
The other set of solutions of (A. 8) is
K = -(2b - r)(s + e)
(2b - r)
E = A {a - p) - a(B + e)}
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From (a. 11) and (A. 3), we finally get
(A.12) xMp(t)) = |-^ - I2b_^(^ _ ^) , (,, _ ^)p(^)^
and
(A. 13) p = -^-ll (|-^- a)-{b - r)p(t)
which shows that, as long as (b - r) > 0, the population converges
to the target or desired population. The target population then is found
as
(^•^^) p^^ = F(r^-^)b ^3
and the target catch will be
(A. 15)
.'..f^
(a, 13) can be integrated out to be
(A. 16) p(p^. t) =(p^ - p>'Oe'^^"'^* + p'^
By using (A. 16) we can write (A.12) as
(A.12) x-.v(p^, t) = |^+ (2b - r)(p^ - p-'-)e"^^"'^'
which is a monotone increasing (decreasing) function of t when p < p-
(p > p") , and converges to
., ^
, as t-x>°.
o p + o
The discrepancy between the social value and the private cost will
be
(A. 17) ^Mt) = ^^^ ' '"> {{a - y) - a(B + e)}
- (2b - r)(& + e)p(t)
/ -.-> --(b-r)t
=
-(p^ - p")e
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which shows
(A. 18)
.
A-'-(t) ^ for all t > if P < P"
X-'^(t) < for al 1 t > if p > p^-
o
and A-'=(t) convergest uniformly to zero as t-H»,
Now the market demand price and supply price can be written as
the functions of p(t):
(A. 19) P. = ex - 6x-'^(p(t))
= a - e
g - p (2b - r) a - y
3 + 9 b B + 9
« -
^(firf)- 3(2b - r)(p^ - p-v)e-(^-^)t
a) + (2b - r) p(t)
(A. 20) P^ = , + exMp(t)) = p ^ GJi^ - i^^^ (|-^ - a) ^ (2b - r)p(t)]
= V* - e^i-Te^ - 6 (2b - r)(p - p--0'
(b-r)t
From (A. 12') we can derive the following result:
(A. 21) °>^^'^^Py '^ = (p^ - p>v)e-(b-r)t . ^(2b - r)t - 1}.
Thus, the optimal catch is greater as r increases before the
time reaches l/(2b - r) , after which it becomes less, other things
being equal
.
In deriving the phase diagram, the knowledge about x = h(p, x)
functional form is needed. One can, however, easily derive for this
case as
(A. 22) X = (b - r) (
^ ^ ^
- x),
which is independent of p. Clearly
X ^ when x £ x*
s
Q •" y •
"
= x-'>, and x ^ when x ^ x'-'
D + o S
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MONOPOLY MARKET
The monopoly case can be solved in exactly the same manner as
;he competitive market case, and we will not repeat the procedures here.
V. SMITH MODELS
In his 1968 paper [9], Smith advanced his dynamics in line with
:he stability arguments of the general equilibrium theory. Assumption
(1.3) is a typical one. We argue [1, 801-802] that the dynamics on the
;ontrol is inherent in the system and can be derived from the system of
the necessary optimal ity conditions (lO). This difference makes a sig-
lificant difference in investigating the path of convergence or divergence
3f optimal controls if they exist.
Without going into a detailed analysis, let us derive paths below
in Figure A.l for a more general fish population dynamics, given by a
quadratic function
(A. 23) p=a+bp-cp
-x= /(p> x)
where
a, b, c > 0.
For simplicity's sake, let us assume that the social benefit
function is also quadratic, but in this case takes the following form:
(A.2i») W = je"'"^{ax- j Bx^ - (y - wp) x - ^x^ldt,
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where \i, w, 6 > 0, and fishing industry enjoys the external
economy from the increasing fish population, p, that is, the industry
supply function is written as
(A. 25) P = (y - wp) + ex.
Now, our competitive market optimal control problem is defined
as
Problem A.
1
:
Find optimal catch control path(s) that maximizes (A. 2^) subject
to (A. 23) for the time horizon [0, T) , where T may be infinity.
After a simpie manipulation of the necessary optimal ity conditions
(see Simaan and Takayama [ij, pp. 801-802), one can get the follovjing
X = h(p, x) functional form:
(A. 26) X
1
+ 8
aw + (b-r)(a-y) + { (2b - r) - 2c(a - y) }
3cwp^ + 2c(g + e)px - {(b - r) (3 + e) + 2w}xU h(p, x)
which is strictly concave, quadratic function of p for any level of x.
Therefore, we have the following general phase diagram. We draw only one
diagram in which convergent paths exist.
In general, the intersections of .f(p, x) = (A. 23), and
h(p, x) = (A. 26), produce at most, three solutions with respect to
p. Figure A.l below shows the case with two positive real solutions and
another solution at a negative value of p and/or x. The two solutions
are E^ and E . Stable converging optimal catch paths are A.E
,
A'E,, and
->•
->• -^
^^^2^2" '^"Stable paths are E B. and E.B (eventually coincides stable path
a;e2).
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p p, P P
Figure A. 1 . A Nonlinear Case with Two Equilibria (E. and E„)
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In case the initial fish population is at p, there is no optimal
control for this system, contrary to the Smith reasoning (he considers
K as a state variable as well as X? In the optimal control framewori<,
clear-cut understanding of state variables and control variables is abso-
lutely necessary). The path Smith claims as optimal starting at (p, 0)
must be a suboptimal path in our framework (see Figure A.l). For the fish
population ranging between p and p„we have optimal control catch path
along which the social benefit will be maximized in the long run.
Which equilibria between E and E_ the society would like to reach
is a completely open question at this stage.
We plan to take up nonlinear models in the near future and investi-
gate some important issues and problems in fisheries economics in a new
model framework.
In my model the total industry catch is the sole control
variable. The number of firms N(t) in the industry can then be written
as
N(t) = k X
, where X is the
where A is similar to that in my ( 10.2) ,/marg i nal discrepancy between
market demand price and average private cost of the fish. This way N(t)
can be traced outside of themodel
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